
CertiKOS: A Breakthrough toward Hacker-Resistant Operating Systems

Zhong Shao Yale University January 25, 2018

Acknowledgement: Ronghui Gu, Newman Wu, Hao Chen, Jieung Kim, Jeremie Koenig, Vilhelm Sjoberg, Mengqi Liu, Lionel Rieg, Quentin Carbonneaux, Unsung Lee, Jiyong Shin, David Costanzo, Tahina Ramananandro, Hernan Vanzetto, Shu-Chun Weng, Zefeng Zeng, Zhencao Zhang, Liang Gu, Jan Hoffmann, Joshua Lockerman, and Bryan Ford. This research is supported in part by DARPA CRASH and HACMS programs and NSF SaTC and **Expeditions in Computing** programs.












Mobile







Hardware











System Software Runs Everywhere





"

Program testing can be used to show the presence of bugs, but never to show their absence.

Edsger Dijkstra

Complete formal verification is the **only** known way to guarantee that a system is free of programming errors.

— seL4 [SOSP'09]


Formal methods are the **only** reliable way to achieve security and privacy in computer systems.


—NSF SFM Report[2016]

Formal Verification nal verification is the only mathematically prove program meets specification under all inputs under all execution rule out entire classes of attacks

— NSF SFM Report[2016]


System Software Runs Everywhere







Challenges: huge proof efforts






Abstraction Gap




A Complex System




A Complex System



A Complex System







Challenges: Concurrency


fine-grained lock fine-grained lock

I/O concurrency


multi-thread

multiprocessor

Challenges: Concurrency




Challenges: Concurrency





Challenges: New Domain





Challenges: New Domain






Certified Abstraction Layers

CertiKOS

aim to solve all these challenges

Certified Abstraction Layers

untangle



Certified Abstraction Layers

verify existing systems


build the next generation system software designed to be reliable and secure

Certified Abstraction Layers

verify existing systemsbuildcertified system software

Certified Abstraction Layers


verify existing systemsbuildcertified system software



Certified Abstraction Layers

verify existing systems

build certified system software





Certified Abstraction Layers

verify existing systemsbuildcertified system software


Certified System Software

Certified Abstraction Layers







Certified Abstraction Layers







Certified Abstraction Layers



Certified
Abstraction
Layers

mCertiKOS [POPL'15] certified sequential OS kernels 3k C&Asm, 1 py

Interrupt [PLDI'16a] 0.5 py

Security [PLDI'16b] 0.5 py

mC2 [OSDI'16] [CCAL 2017]

the **first** formally certified **concurrent** OS kernel with fine-grained locks 6.5k C&Asm, 2 py

Certified
System
Software


functional correctness

liveness


no stack/integer/buffer overflow

no race condition






mC2




Proof Assistant ACM Software System Award Some of the significant results that were accomplished using Coq are proofs for the four color theorem, the development of yers CompCert (a fully verified compiler for C), the development at Harvard of a verified version of Google's software fault isolation, and most recent, the fully specified and verified hypervisor OS kernel CertiKOS. ACM

Deployment



CertiKOS on Landshark, DARPA HACMS

Deployment




CertiKOS on Quadcopter


Case Study

Build a Certified System


Compiler




Certified Sequential Layer [POPL'15]





Certified Sequential Layer [POPL'15]




Certified Sequential Layer [POPL'15]








specification



specification



```
typedef struct tcb {
   state s;
   tcb *prev, *next;
} tcb;

tcb tcbp[1024];

typedef struct tdq {
   tcb *head, *tail;
} tdq;

tdq* td_queue;
```




implementation

```
typedef struct tcb {
   state s;
   tcb *prev, *next;
} tcb;

tcb tcbp[1024];

typedef struct tdq {
   tcb *head, *tail;
} tdq;
}

tdq* td_queue;
```




```
typedef struct tcb {
    state s;
    tcb *prev, *next;
} tcb;

tcb tcbp[1024];


typedef struct tdq {
    tcb *head, *tail;
} tdq;


tdq* td_queue;
```




```
typedef struct tdq {
                typedef struct tcb {
                                         tcb *head, *tail;
                   state s;
                   tcb *prev, *next;
                                       } tdq;
                } tcb;
                                       tdq* td_queue;
                tcb tcbp[1024];
                                         head
                                                        tail
                           tcbp[0]
                                             tcbp[1]
                                                            tcbp[2]
                                                         s2
                            s0
                                          S1
implementation
```


```
tcb* dequeue(tdq* q) {
    tcb *head, *next;
    tcb *i = null;
    if (!q) return i;
    head = q -> head;
    if (!head) return i;
    i = head;
    next = i -> next;
    }
    if (!next) {
        q -> head = null;
        q -> tail = null;
        q -> prev = null;
        q -> head = next;
        prev = null;
        p
```







```
tcb* dequeue(tdq* q) {
   tcb *head, *next;
   tcb *i = null;
   if (!q) return i;
   head = q -> head;
   if (!next) {
      q -> head = null;
      q -> tail = null;
      } else {
      next -> prev = null;
      q -> head = next;
   }
   next = i -> next;
   }
   return i;
}
```





```
tcb* dequeue(tdq* q) {
   tcb *head, *next;
   tcb *i = null;
   if (!q) return i;
   head = q -> head;
   if (!next) {
      q -> head = null;
      q -> tail = null;
      } else {
      next -> prev = null;
      q -> head = next;
   }
   if (!next) {
      q -> head = null;
      q -> head = null;
      return i;
      q -> head = next;
   }
   return i;
   }
```





specification




Definition **tcbp** := ZMap.t state.

Definition **td_queue** := List Z.



specification




Definition **tcbp** := ZMap.t state.

Definition **td_queue** := List Z.



specification






Definition **tcbp** := ZMap.t state.


Definition **td_queue** := List Z.

Coq

specification




specification



```
Function dequeue (q) := match q with | head :: q' => (q', Some head) | nil => (nil, None) end.
```

specification




```
Function dequeue (q) := match q with | head :: q' => (q', Some head) | nil => (nil, None) end.
```


executable

Simulation Proof

specification



Deep Specification [POPL'15]



kernel

code


seq machine

kernel

Trap
PM
TM

seq machine

memory management



seq machine

kernel

Trap

PM

TM

MM

trap Trap proc PM thread TM mem seq machine

kernel

Trap

PM

TM

MM

VM

Trap

PM

 TM

MM

certified sequential kernel

trap

proc

thread

mem

seq machine

Trap
VM
PM
TM
MM

Trap VM trap PM TM vm MMVM virt proc thread mem seq machine virt

certified hypervisor

trap vm virt proc thread mem virt seq machine


Trap

VM

PM

 TM

MM




TSysCall Layer

(pe, ikern, ihost, ipt, AT, PT, ptp, pbit, kctxp, Htcbp, Htqp, cid, chanp, uctxp, npt, hctx, vmst)


thread_wakeup/kill/sleep/yield		р	pt_read		get/set_uctx			palloc/free		cid_get	
sys_chan_send/recv/wait/check			sys_yield	sys_get_exi			_exit	t_reason		sys_get_eip	
sys_check_shadow/pending_event sys_				oc_create sy			sys	sys_set_seg		sys_inject	
sys_get_exit_io_width/port/rep/str/write/eip					sys_set_intcept_int s				sys	_npt_instr	
vmcbinit	pagefault_handler	sys_reg_get/			set	sys_	sync	sys_	run	vm_exit	







certified sequential kernel


trap	
virt	
proc	
thread	
mem	
	seq machine








local certified objects




atomic objects



atomic objects



atomic objects







 L_1



fine-grained locking



Concurrent Framework



CPU-local machine

CPU0

CPU1

CPU2

CPU3




multicore machine

CPU0


CPU1

CPU2


CPU3




non-determinism




non-determinism




non-determinism



step 1: logical hardware scheduler



step 1: logical hardware scheduler



step 1: logical hardware scheduler

$$\forall \ \mathcal{E}_{hs}$$

multicore machine

CPU0


CPU1

CPU2


CPU3



















































step 4: remove unnecessary interleaving







step 4: remove unnecessary interleaving









step 4: remove unnecessary interleaving





Machine Lifting



multicore machine

CPU0

CPU1


CPU2

CPU3

Case Study

Build a Certified System


Compiler



Case Study


Build a Certified System

Compiler



Acquire Lock Specification

safely pull




Acquire Lock Specification

safely
pull

return

Acquire Lock Specification

mutual exclusion



liveness

Example: Ticket Lock

mutual exclusion + liveness

```
void acq_lock (uint i)
{
  uint64 t = FAI_ticket (i);

  while ( get_now (i) != t)
  { }

  pull (i);
}
```

Example: Ticket Lock


mutual exclusion + liveness

Example: Ticket Lock


mutual exclusion + liveness


```
void acq_lock (uint i)
{
  uint64 t = FAI_ticket (i);
  while ( get_now ( get_now ( now )))
}


pull (i);
}
```



```
void acq_lock (uint i)
{
  uint64 t = FAI_ticket (i);
  while ( get_now ( get_now ( ))
} pull (i);
}
```









```
void acq_lock (uint i)
{
  uint64 t = FAI_ticket (i);


while ( get_now (i) != t)
{ }
  pull (i);
}
```








```
void acq_lock (uint i)
{
  uint64 t = FAI_ticket (i);
  while ( get_now (i) != t)
  { }
  pull (i);
}
```





```
void acq_lock (uint i)
{
  uint64 t = FAI_ticket (i);


  while ( get_now (i) kt)
  {
}
  pull (i);
}
```

bug in the original implementation

mutual exclusion will be violated when there is an integer overflow for t


Build a Certified System


Compiler




Build a Certified System

Compiler











logical copy






shared memory


logical

сору






logical copy





deq




dequeue




Build a Certified System

Compiler



Build a Certified System


Compiler




Thread-Local Machine

```
void yield ()
{
  uint t = tid();
  ...
  enq (t, rdq());
  uint s = deq (rdq());
  ...
  context_switch (t, s)
}
```


Thread-Local Machine




Build a Certified System




Build a Certified System




Device Driver [PLDI16'a]




Device Driver [PLDI16'a]




Build a Certified System



Build a Certified System



End-to-End Security [PLDI16'b]




Observation function *O*

- specify and prove general security policies with declassification
 - security-preservation simulation
 - non-interference

found security-bugs: spawn, palloc,...

Build a Certified System



Summary: Certified OS

CertiKOS is the first fully certified OS kernel that is done economically (< 3 person years), proves more properties, runs on concurrent HW, and is truly extensible

Still very high barriers of entry:

- (1) OS kernel development is very difficult
- (2) Formal specifications and proofs are hard to build
- (3) Need intimate programming language expertise to succeed
- These are three completely different communities
- Most people can only do one out of the above three.
- The Yale team has been working on all three for >15 years

Summary: OS Landscape (Nov 2017)

Desktop: Linux, macOS, Windows, ChromeOS, freeBSD, ...

Hypervisor/Cloud: Linux KVM & Docker, VMWare, Xen, ...

Mobile: Android (Linux), iOS, ...

Embedded: Embedded Linux, VxWorks, QNX, LynxOS, ...

- All of them are bloated, old, and contain many bugs
- Urgently need new OSes for emerging platforms & apps (IoTs, Drones, Self-Driving Cars, Cloud, NetworkOS, Blockchains, ...)

OS evolution has reached an inflection point:

Need a certified OS that provides security, extensibility, performance, and can work across multiple platforms.